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‘Gulf War syndrome’ is a phrase coined after the 1991 Gulf War to group together disparate,
unexplained health symptoms in Gulf veterans. This paper examines the many hypotheses that
have been put forward about the origins of the concept and gives an overview of the studies that
have attempted to explain the lasting health effects associated with Gulf service. Our review
finds that although in the UK there has not yet been evidence of a new Gulf War syndrome as a
result of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a rise in post-conflict psychiatric
disorders now being reported in the USA. We postulate that after conflicts military personnel will
always face some form of post-conflict syndrome and the nature of the threats experienced is
likely to dictate the form the syndrome might take. We also postulate that media reporting is
likely to have influenced and to continue unhelpfully to influence the health of service personnel.
Introduction
In 1991, a coalition of troops liberated Kuwait from the
control of Iraqi forces. The war-fighting phase of the 1991
conflict was short and associated with minimal casualties to
Coalition forces. Initially, the conflict was a medical success
story, not only in terms of the low number of battle
casualties but also the minimal burden of heat-related or
infectious diseases, traditionally a major source of both
morbidity and mortality for service personnel in operations
carried out in testing environments.
However, just a few months after the war, media reports of
first an apparent, but never confirmed, cluster of birth
defects
1 in the children of some Gulf veterans, and later of
unexplained health symptoms in other Gulf veterans began
to emerge. These reports began in the USA but gradually
spread to nearly all the countries that had taken part in the
coalition against Saddam Hussein, with the possible excep-
tion of Saudi Arabia. Finally, and it is unclear exactly when or
by whom, the term ‘Gulf War syndrome’ (GWS) was coined
to group these disparate phenomena together.
The nature and existence of GWS have been and continue
to be the subject of heated debates, even though more of the
recent attention has switched to the latest conflict in Iraq.
This article reviews the origins of GWS and the numerous
explanations of its nature, and compares the research carried
out on veterans of the Gulf War with that on veterans of the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq. It also considers the nature of
future psychological challenges that may affect service
personnel currently conducting operational duties around
the world.
The beginnings of a ‘GWS’
In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait.
The international community responded by convening a
coalition military force derived from the USA (697,000
troops committed), the UK (53,500 troops), France (25,000
troops) and over 30 other nations, including Saudi Arabia,
Denmark, Canada, and Australia.
After five weeks of intense bombardment of Iraqi posi-
tions, the ground war began on 24 February 1991 and lasted
only four days. It was a resounding military success, and a
triumph for military medical services. Traditionally, offen-
sive operations are associated with large numbers of disease
non-battle injury casualties from causes such as heat illness.
However, in the 1991 Gulf War there were no deaths from
disease non-battle injuries among US or British troops.
2 Yet
death is not the only important, or indeed media-worthy,
outcome, as the GWS story showed in a powerful way.
The initial reports
The first media reports of unusual illnesses occurring in Gulf
War veterans began to emerge from the USA towards the end
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quirer, 1993). Initial stories tended to focus on two health
concerns: unusual illnesses in previously fit veterans and an
increase in birth defects in veterans’ children. Understand-
ably, there was considerable public interest and the media
responded by increasing their coverage of the issue. It
remains unclear who coined the term ‘GWS’, but consider-
able media and public pressure led to both the USA, and
subsequently, the UK, conducting epidemiological research.
The first studies
The first response was to set up disease registers that enabled
Gulf veterans to attend a clinic and undergo a comprehen-
sive health assessment. These began in the USA with the
establishment of the Department of Defense and Veterans
Affairs Health Examination Registry Program. The UK
followed with the Gulf War Veterans Medical Assessment
Programme. More than 100,000 veterans attended these
programmes, more than 90% of these in the USA.
3,4 Case
registers such as these are not random samples of the
population and caution should be applied before drawing
any firm conclusions from the data derived from them.
Given the numbers involved, however, these should have
sufficient power to detect any major increase in a well-
recognised illness or disease or to indicate an emergent
condition. Neither of these was identified in studies based on
the Gulf War veteran registers,
4 where the largest diagnostic
category was ‘medically unexplained symptoms and syn-
dromes’.
3,5,6
Cancer and mortality
The media have claimed that Gulf War veterans suffered an
increase in mortality rates.
7 However, comprehensive ana-
lyses of the US and UK Gulf cohorts
7 have not shown an
increase in mortality in both groups, other than a rise in the
rate of accidental death (US and UK) or suicide (US only).
This observation has often been made in the aftermath of
other conflicts
8,9 and is possibly linked to an increase in risk-
taking behaviour. Furthermore, no increase was found in
cancer rates among UK or Australian veterans of the Gulf
War.
10,11
The Gulf War health effect
Increased rates of symptom reporting in a Gulf cohort were
first picked up by an US Army study looking at reservist
personnel in Indiana
12 and then confirmed by the Iowa
Persian Gulf Study Group.
13 Incidence of conditions such as
chronic fatigue syndrome, depression, and post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) were all elevated. All these are based
on reported symptoms rather than objective clinical
markers.
The UK’s first systematic epidemiological study compared
4246 randomly selected British Gulf War veterans, drawn
from all three Services with similar numbers of non-deployed
personnel (the so-called ‘Era’ group), and with an active duty
control group who had served, some years later, in the
Bosnian conflict. The results showed that UK Gulf veterans
were 2–3 times more likely to report each and every one of
the 50 physical symptoms that were inquired about than
either the Era group or the Bosnian group (Figure 1).
14–16
Furthermore, although perceived health was decreased in the
Gulf cohort, physical functioning was only very slightly
different and still above expected non-military norms.
These are not isolated findings.
17–19 A review by Barrett
et al.
20 again concluded that Gulf War veterans report 2–3
times the rates of common symptoms compared with their
non-deployed colleagues. Other studies have also found that
health perception and quality of life are impaired in those
who were deployed to the Gulf compared with military
personnel who were not.
21,22 Investigators did find an
unexplained twofold increase in rates of seborrhoeic derma-
titis,
23 a result that awaits replication.
A large US study performed using multiple methods of
data collection has reported 40 cases of amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS). The US government considered this signifi-
cant enough to declare the disease service-attributable.
24
However, there remains good reason to believe that the
excess is the result of an ascertainment bias, in which greater
efforts were made to find cases in Gulf veterans than in
control individuals, together with an unusually low rate of
ALS in those control individuals.
25,26 An increase in ALS has
also been reported in veterans of other wars where there was
no suggestion of exposure to organophosphate nerve agents,
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Figure 1 Graphical representation of the Gulf health effect.
14 The graph
represents a comparison of the three personnel groups studied by the King’s
College London Group. The Gulf group deployed to the War, the Era group
was in the military at the time of the War but was not deployed and the Bosnia
group deployed to Bosnia a few years later (representing another deployed
group for comparison). To the left are common symptoms, such as fatigue or
headache, whereas to the right are unusual symptoms, such as a lump in the
throat, night sweats, or urinary frequency. It is clear that there is no difference
between personnel deployed to Bosnia and personnel in the military in
general in 1991 who did not deploy to the Gulf at that time. It is striking that
the Gulf cohort is different. Of equal interest is that the shape of the curve
between the Gulf and the control groups does not differ, suggesting that no
specific symptom is linked with Gulf Service. Instead, personnel who were
deployed to the Gulf simply report more of each and every symptom that they
were asked about.
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27 Further-
more, there has not been an increase in mortality owing to
neurological disease in Gulf Veterans, which would be
expected as ALS is ultimately fatal. ALS is still rare,
fortunately, in groups of veterans and cannot explain the
overall increase in symptomatology in Gulf veterans.
Psychological sequelae
The numerous studies investigating Gulf War veterans have
found that many fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for depres-
sion and anxiety, as well as for chronic fatigue syndrome,
multiple chemical sensitivity, and irritable bowel syndrome.
Expert committees have concluded, perhaps unsurprisingly,
that there is a clear association between deployment to the
Gulf and a range of psychiatric and behavioural disorders.
28
On the other hand, the size of the association may not be
sufficient to explain all the observed ill health. In one of few
studies using direct interviews, for example, we have shown
that many Gulf veterans who were unwell did not fulfil the
criteria for formal psychiatric disorders.
29 The conclusion is
that although the rate of true psychiatric disorders doubled
in Gulf veterans, when compared with the absolute illness
burden as a result of formal psychiatric disorders, it remains
low. For example, only 3% of our randomly chosen sample
had PTSD.
30 So although personnel were twice as likely to
have PTSD if they went to the Gulf,
31 most Gulf veterans,
even those with increased levels of physical symptoms, did
not have mental health disorders. Therefore, classic psychia-
tric disorders per se cannot account for the Gulf War health
effect in its entirety.
Limitations of the epidemiological studies
Many of the better studies of the effect of service in the Gulf
have used epidemiological techniques to study large samples
of veterans.
11,13,14 Most studies have used self-report mea-
sures and it is important to note that these tend to have a
poor correlation with findings of clinical physical examina-
tion.
32 For instance, when ‘medically unexplained syn-
dromes’, which are characterised by symptoms very similar
to those of GWS, have been investigated in the non-military
samples where they are very common, fewer than one in five
are found to have a discrete biomedical explanation.
33 Thus,
it would be misleading to assume that reporting of
symptoms is closely linked with suffering from a diagnosable
disease or disorder.
34
Recall and participant biases are important considerations
and have affected the investigation of GWS. The literature
confirms that many things influence the recall of military
hazards, not just what actually happened.
35 A study using
medical records of a group that supposedly prepared for
deployment to the Gulf but did not actually deploy showed
that less than 1% of those who recalled having received a
biological warfare vaccine had done so.
36 What can never be
controlled for is that personnel who were in the Gulf will
always remember that they were there. As such, participant
bias is likely to have a role and those who were deployed may
be more likely to attribute their symptoms to their Gulf
deployment. However, when we asked currently serving
personnel about health status in a different context to
deployment history and then later ascertained who had
served in the Gulf, the differences in health reporting
between Gulf and non-Gulf personnel remained.
37
Is the phrase ‘GWS’ valid?
There is substantial evidence to suggest that there is an
identifiable Gulf health effect but that effect does not
amount to a discrete disorder or indeed syndrome. To
identify a GWS as a unique condition, it would be necessary
to show that there was a constellation of symptoms and
signs specifically related to service in the Gulf; numerous
controlled studies have shown this is not the case.
14,20
Furthermore, the symptoms experienced by veterans also
occur elsewhere, without an association with Gulf deploy-
ment.
38,39
Most scientists, but not all, share this view. Robert Haley, a
US epidemiologist in Dallas, Texas, was the first to present
evidence suggestive of a new syndrome
40 and continues to
espouse this position. However, his study was based on a
single reserve battalion, failed to achieve a satisfactory
response rate, but most importantly had no control group.
As others have pointed out on many occasions,
41 this makes
it impossible to determine whether the reported constella-
tion of symptoms is indeed unique to Gulf War veterans.
Since then he has claimed evidence of first peripheral, and
then later on, central nerve damage in Gulf veterans,
attributable, in his view, to exposure to a combination of
chemical weapons and/or pesticides.
42,43 However, several
expert review panels have not been convinced either by the
medical evidence or the suggestion of exposure to chemical
weapons.
44,45 Other studies
46,47 failed to find evidence of
significant damage to the peripheral nervous system in Gulf
veterans, making exposure to organophosphate pesticides an
unlikely cause of ill health in these people. Well-conducted
neuropsychological studies of central nervous system func-
tion in Gulf veterans have not shown compelling evidence of
damage.
48 A replication of the original neuroimaging study
is keenly anticipated but if history is to be a guide, will most
likely prove reassuring.
Numerous papers have shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there are substantial numbers of veterans labelled with
GWS who have identifiable problems; reported prevalence
rates range from 20 to 30%.
49–52 Furthermore, we do not
consider that the reporting of symptoms is, in the main, a
result of attempts to procure financial rewards. The British
War Pension system does not require a formal diagnosis to
award compensation, simply an opinion on the level of
disability, from whatever cause. In spite of many Gulf
Veterans having received monetary recompense for their
disabilities, evidence suggests that most Gulf veterans who
were ill in 1996 were still unwell in 2001.
53
Yet whatever the inadequacies of the term, GWS has
captured the popular and media imagination and is probably
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Ministry of Defence accepted the phrase GWS, for the
purpose of awarding war pensions, with the caveat that the
term was an umbrella term covering the various clinical
presentations and outcomes. However, it is noteworthy that
not all coalition allies (e.g. the French military) have come to
the same view.
Who is at risk?
In general, the associations of illness in Gulf War veterans
tend to be nonspecific. For example, symptoms are neither
associated with any particular service nor with what an
individual service person did while in the Gulf.
54 Personnel
in the combat or ‘teeth’ sections, for example, do not have
elevated rates of ill health compared with others. Rank,
though, is a consistent marker of ill health. Personnel of
lower rank, which may be taken as a proxy for lower
educational status, have a greater burden of symptoms.
55,56
Several US studies report that reservists and women are at
increased risk,
52,57 suggesting a possible predisposition.
However, again, this was not the case for UK personnel.
14
What are the proposed causes?
Despite the above, a variety of agents have been alleged to be
the ‘cause’ of GWS. In general, most of these claims have not
been substantiated. For example, depleted uranium (DU),
used in munitions such as tank shells, is often proposed as a
possible cause of ill health in Gulf personnel. Those most
likely to come into contact with DU would have been
personnel working in or around armoured vehicles. But, as
already discussed, there is no link between the role an
individual veteran fulfilled and reporting of symptoms.
Likewise, those personnel who have been injured with DU
fragments, thus indisputably exposed, have not suffered
adverse health consequences to date.
58 Evidence from the
2003 Iraq war has also failed to link exposure to DU with
health problems in Coalition forces.
59
Another exposure often mentioned relates to the pyridos-
tigmine bromide tablets that were used as a prophylactic
against possible effects of exposure to some chemical
weapons. However, Canada sent three ships to the Gulf,
only two of which used pyridostigmine bromide prophy-
laxis, yet the rate of illness was the same in personnel from
all three ships.
60
Other putative agents include organophosphate pesticides.
These were successfully used to decrease the threat of disease
from insect vectors but if handled incorrectly can cause
damage to the nervous system. Detailed studies of the
peripheral nervous system in both US- and UK-derived
samples have failed to find evidence of neuropathy and a
large US epidemiological survey of Gulf veterans and their
families came to the same conclusion.
61
Another claim is that ill health has resulted from accidental
exposure to organophosphate-based nerve agents, of which
the chief culprit was sarin nerve agent that may have been
released unnoticed with the destruction of the Iraqi arms
dump at Khamisayah. It has also been claimed that there was a
deliberate but undetected use of sarin by Iraqi forces but this
has little or no military credibility. However, irrespective of
whether sarin was released into the environment, expert
committees have not been convinced that this could be
responsible for the observed ill health, not least given the
chemical doses and exposure distances involved.
44,62
On the other hand, there is some epidemiological
evidence linking the particular pattern of vaccinations given
to protect personnel against biological warfare with sub-
sequent ill health. The UK group from King’s College
London, for example, reported an association between
symptomatic outcomes and receiving multiple vaccinations
in general, or specific jabs against chemical and biological
weapons (CWBs), such as the anthrax vaccine. However,
detailed investigations have failed to confirm that this link is
immunologically mediated, and the possibility that pro-
blems in record keeping (acknowledged as a major defi-
ciency) and recall bias account for some of this association
remains a real one.
14,36,51,63
Other potential causative agents, including fumes from
burning oil wells,
64 have also been investigated but detailed
environmental monitoring at the time and subsequent
outcome studies
64 have failed to find convincing evidence
to support these or other more maverick theories.
41
In the above section, we have touched on part of what is
now a considerable body of literature on the proposed risks.
We acknowledge that there are some who are convinced that
at least one or more of these possible hazards are indeed the
cause of ill health in Gulf veterans. Golomb,
65 for example,
has argued for some years that the combined effect of
exposure to acetyl cholinesterase inhibitors, such as nerve
agents, pyridostigmine bromide, and pesticides, are indeed
directly causal in this context. However, a long series of
authoritative and extensive reviews, such as those produced
by the prestigious and independent Institute of Medicine in
the United States and others,
41,44,45,62 have failed to be
convincing through these arguments. No compelling evi-
dence has yet emerged implicating any hazardous substance,
acting alone or in combination, in the genesis of ill health in
Gulf veterans. We think it is unlikely that this position will
change materially.
What is the treatment and prognosis?
There has not been a consensus on which therapies are most
effective for the symptoms of GWS. Cognitive behavioural
therapy has been tried, using approaches similar to that used
for other medically unexplained symptoms such as chronic
fatigue syndrome. In 2003, the US Department of Defense
and the Veterans Administration carried out a large trial
comparing cognitive behavioural therapy, graded exercise
therapy, and a combination of both. The trial had 1092
symptomatic Gulf veterans. The resulting improvements
were only modest,
66 although it would be premature to
assume that differently designed rehabilitative programmes
would not achieve better success.
67
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report poor health. Hotopf et al.
53 followed up after four
years a cohort of people who believed they had GWS. They
remained unwell, although interestingly, the health gap
between the Gulf and Era groups appeared to be narrowing.
Post-conflict syndromes
History has many examples of post-conflict ill health
syndromes.
68 From the middle of the nineteenth century,
when interpretable medical records and accounts began to
be kept, there are clinical descriptions of ex-servicemen with
considerable similarities to the Gulf narratives. Their condi-
tions have received many different labels: Soldier’s Heart,
later termed Effort syndrome, shell shock, neurasthenia and,
more recently, Agent Orange syndrome and PTSD.
Historian Edgar Jones and colleagues conducted a sys-
tematic study of UK war pension files from the Boer War,
the First and Second World Wars, and ending with clinical
files from the Gulf War Medical Assessment Programme.
69
The results showed that post-conflict syndromes with
considerable similarities to Gulf War illness have been
reported after all the major conflicts involving the British
Armed Forces.
The medical literature also contains many other medically
unexplained symptoms with similarities to the Gulf War
health effect, examples being chronic fatigue syndrome,
total allergy syndrome, dental amalgam disease, and sick
building syndrome.
Is there an Iraqi war syndrome?
What light does the current conflict in the Gulf shed on
the health consequences of the 1991 war, and what can we
expect in the future? One lesson that was learned from the
GWS saga was the necessity to conduct large-scale health
surveillance and research from the outset of the deployment,
rather than at a later date, when too much time had elapsed
to unravel a complex chain of causality.
Mindful of the past, the UK Ministry of Defence has
funded an ongoing cohort study of the health of British
service personnel that was planned alongside the military
preparation for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Even larger studies
are in place in the USA. The UK study, however, does have
the advantage of covering all three Services, and of including
not only those still serving in the Armed Forces but also
those who have left. It is independent of the Armed Forces,
which means it is possible to use personally identifiable data
and hence permits direct follow up of personnel.
The King’s studies
After Op TELIC 1, the UK code name for the 2003 invasion of
Iraq, researchers at King’s College London launched a cohort
study
70 to monitor any possible physical or psychological
health effects in members of the UK Armed Forces. The study
compares those who had served on Op TELIC 1 and a single
control group from the remaining members of the Armed
Forces.
The results are surprising: so far there has not been an
increase in the same somatic symptoms that were apparent
in the earlier Gulf War study. There has been a general
increase in symptom reporting across the Armed Forces
(Figure 2), unrelated to deployment, and which most
probably reflects cultural changes in the reporting of
symptoms and ill health that have been observed across
society as a whole.
There is currently no evidence of a recurrence of ‘GWS’
arising in personnel returning from Iraq.
71 Although this is
welcome news for service personnel and their families,
caution must be expressed. We do not know exactly when
the health of those who were deployed to the 1991 Gulf War,
and that of their comrades who were not, began to diverge.
All we can say for sure is that the differences were clearly
apparent six years after the conflict, although there were less
clear suggestions that ‘something’ was amiss as early as 15
months post-conflict. However, it is still premature to
assume that there will be no new Iraq war syndrome.
If history has indeed not repeated itself, what would that
tell us about the possible causes of the Gulf War health
effect? Any situations or exposures that were common to
both conflicts cannot be blamed for the adverse health
effects that arose after the earlier conflict. Both conflicts were
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Figure 2 Graphical comparison of the Gulf health effects of the 1991 Gulf
War and the Iraq War.
30 These graphs are from studies carried out by King’s
College London after the Gulf War and the war in Iraq. The upper graph
reports on a group of personnel who were deployed to Operation Telic (the
UK codename for the Iraq War) and a group who were in the military at the
time of the war but were not deployed. The graph below is the same as that
shown in Figure 1. The graphs illustrate that there is no current evidence of an
Iraq War syndrome and there is no difference between the Telic and Era
groups. It is also evident that both groups now report symptoms at a
frequency similar to the Gulf War group. This represents a general increase in
symptoms reporting over recent years in Western communities.
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Armed Forces used DU munitions in both conflicts. Likewise,
anthrax vaccine was extensively administered to troops
before both conflicts. During the conflicts, organophosphate
pesticides continued to be used to reduce the threat of insect-
borne disease and pyridostigmine bromide tablets were
issued in both conflicts, yet there was only a Gulf War
health effect in the earlier and not the later conflict. Thus, it
follows that none of the above now appear likely candidates
for the Gulf War health effect.
Much has been written about stress as a cause of Gulf War
illness. It is clear that the rates of psychiatric disorder have
doubled in personnel who served in the Gulf compared with
those who did not.
31 There is little doubt that the current
war in Iraq is proving to be a more long-lasting and difficult
engagement than the 1991 conflict. In the USA, the rates of
PTSD in Armed Forces are high and continue to increase after
personnel return from Iraq.
72 Simplistic explanations of
Gulf-related illness as a sole manifestation of PTSD are
likewise difficult to sustain given the considerably more
hostile, prolonged, and dangerous situation in Iraq.
Possible explanations for the Gulf War health effect
Where does this information arising from the 2003 Iraq war
and beyond leave us in finding explanations for the 1991
Gulf War health effect? We need to identify exposures or risk
factors that first reflect the known epidemiology of Gulf War
illness and also did not apply to the 2003 Iraq war (again
assuming that no comparable ‘Iraq War syndrome’ will
emerge). Any putative risk factor must therefore have
affected US, Canadian, Australian, UK, and Danish forces,
and within those forces, the exposure must also have acted
on all the Armed Services with all the different occupations
and roles equally at risk.
Medical countermeasures (MCMs) certainly fulfil the
epidemiological risk profile, given that they were offered to
all the Armed Services irrespective of the role. Yet that would
still have to explain why, for example, the crew of the
Canadian ship that did not use MCMs were subsequently
just as vulnerable to ill health as those on the two sister ships
that did.
60 Or why Danish Gulf War soldiers, who received
no MCMs at all because they were deployed on peacekeeping
duties after the end of the formal hostilities, had almost
identical rates and patterns of illness as US and UK forces.
73
Likewise, it does not seem plausible to ascribe the
differences in outcome to the changes in vaccine regimens
between 1991 and 2003. The UK military authorities have
not accepted that the vaccination programme in place in
1991 was a possible cause of the Gulf War health effect but
nevertheless on a precautionary basis decided to change the
vaccination programme before the invasion of Iraq. In
particular, they decided to cease use of pertussis as an
adjuvant with anthrax vaccine. Subsequent research, made
easier by the improvement in medical record keeping since
1991, has shown convincingly that side effects of the
anthrax vaccine in 2003 were short-lived and not associated
with any longer term increase in symptomatic ill health.
69
However, that does not prove that pertussis was the cause of
the Gulf health effect. The UK was alone in using pertussis in
1991 but not alone in experiencing increased ill health in its
personnel.
The clinical manifestations of service in the 1991 Gulf War
may be influenced by a lack of trust veterans have in
government officials’ comments on aspects of the conflict.
There are similarities between the experiences of Gulf War
veterans and those of Vietnam veterans.
74,75 The perceived
government misinformation about Agent Orange was used
to claim similar cover-ups and conspiracies, as was the Cold
War legacy of experiments carried out on service personnel,
often without consent. Governments on either side of the
Atlantic have made misinformed statements on Gulf issues.
For example, the US government misjudged the Khamisayah
incident (an Iraqi arms dump considered to have held
chemical weapons).
76 The UK government made an inad-
vertently inaccurate statement to Parliament about the use
of organophosphate pesticides.
77 Both episodes led to
further suspicion and occasional paranoia, both of which
contributed to a media circus, and neither of which has
helped the situation of Gulf veterans.
Perception of threat
So we must now consider other possibilities. There were
indeed major differences between the Gulf and Iraq Wars,
and these relate to the issue of the perception of the threat
from Saddam Hussein’s CBW arsenal, the so-called weapons
of mass destruction. The threat from the Iraqi chemical and
biological arsenal in 1991 was real and tangible. CBW agents
had been used earlier against the Iraqi Kurds and in the Iraq–
Iran war. After the war, there was abundant evidence of the
existence of a real CBW arsenal. This was widely known,
and hence high importance was placed on the various MCMs
adopted by the Coalition forces. Not surprisingly, fear of
these unfamiliar but dreaded weapons was easily the most
commonly endorsed concern among service personnel
during the prolonged build-up to the actual war, the period
covered by the term ‘Desert Shield’.
78,79 Because the
threat did not actually materialise, memories soon faded.
Few of our colleagues, for example, recall that Britain’s
National Health Service was mobilised to cope with an
anticipated flood of casualties predicted to overwhelm the
limited military health services and most UK civilian
hospitals had not just plans prepared but wards vacated
and staffed ready for the influx, which thankfully never
materialised.
By 2003, both the US and UK Armed Forces continued to
take the threat from CBW seriously and were unconvinced
that Saddam really had degraded or destroyed his arsenal.
But, the scale of medical preparations in the UK, for
example, was very different to that in 1991, and there was
no mobilisation of the NHS. Soon after the beginning of the
conflict it became clear that for whatever reason the threat
from CBW was not going to materialise.
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tion, that one of the principle differences between the Gulf
War of 1991 and the Iraq war of 2003 has been in the
perception of threat of CBW. On the one hand, the effect of
the high levels of concern about this threat during the six
months of Desert Shield, reinforced by over 4500 chemical
alarms triggered during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
cannot be underestimated. Concentrating on the substantial
evidence that all the alarms proved negative (see http://
www.gulflink.osd.mil/library/osagwi_reports.jsp for full doc-
umentation) misses the point. Each alarm would increase
anxiety as well as confirm that the risks were tangible,
invisible, and potentially uncontrollable. Subsequent work
has shown that a belief that one was exposed to chemical
weapons has steadily increased, most particularly in US Gulf
veterans, and is also the strongest single association for
symptomatic ill health.
40,80–82
Media coverage
A second possibility is that the extent and nature of the
coverage of GWS itself served to amplify and reinforce
symptoms and disability. There is now a vast and uncon-
troversial literature that what one thinks about an ill-
nessFits nature, cause, and likely outcomeFhas a
powerful effect on the persistence and prognosis of the
illness. This applies to many conditions, irrespective of any
presumed physical or psychological aetiology, but is natu-
rally particularly marked for the so-called ‘unexplained’
syndromes exemplified by Gulf War illness. Thus, the early
stereotypes of GWSFmysterious, ill-defined, but linked to a
series of potentially serious and frequently anxiety-provok-
ing exposures, and alleged to be associated with tangible
damage to the peripheral and/or central nervous system
Fmay have become self-fulfilling. In keeping with extensive
literature from other unexplained illnesses, it is not surpris-
ing that we found that believing one suffered from GWS was
an independent and prospective predictor of a worse
outcome.
83
No ‘Iraq War syndrome’ but plenty of mental health
problems
Assuming that there is no new Iraq War syndrome does not
mean there have been no serious or enduring health
problems appearing in personnel returning from Iraq.
Starting with the UK Armed Forces, we found no increase
in psychiatric disorders in regular personnel who have served
in Iraq, at least up to 2006.
70 This does not mean that there
were no cases of psychiatric injury, but that there was no
excess compared with all the other deployments of the UK
Armed Forces as represented by the non-Iraq control group.
However, reservists who served in Iraq were indeed more
likely to have symptoms suggestive of common mental
health problems and/or PTSD compared with reservists who
were not deployed.
70 The explanation for this is not readily
apparent and was not related to increased exposure to
traumatic events. It may be partly explained by the way
reservists are rapidly reintegrated back into civilian life after
deployment. What was also clear was an observation that has
been made repeatedly by us in other samples
84 and by other
researchers:
85 that PTSD is not the most common mental
health problem in the Armed Forces; that ‘honour’ belongs
to alcohol problems and/or depression.
In contrast, US studies show a much higher rate of PTSD in
their troops compared with UK Armed Forces.
72 There are
differences between the US and UK deployments that may
help to explain this. The US Forces undertook more fighting
and had more physical casualties, and this is indisputably
associated with more psychological injuries. The US autho-
rities deployed their troops for a year at a time, sometimes
more, whereas UK military personnel usually have 4–6
month tours of duty. This means that US personnel had
more opportunities for traumatic exposures and also their
length of time away from home was itself a stressor.
86 Other
factors may also be at play. For instance, UK military
personnel tend to be older than their US equivalents and
there are also differences in the organisation of healthcare
services once personnel leave the Armed Forces and return to
civilian life.
Post-conflict syndromes: an emerging health
threat?
It seems unlikely that any single cause of the Gulf War health
effect will ever be discovered and it is heartening that for
whatever reasons our Iraq War veterans do not as yet seem to
be experiencing a repeat of GWS. We say ‘as yet’ because no
one knows when the Gulf health effect was first detectable,
only that it was present at a minimum of five years after the
conflict.
The absence of a new ‘unexplained’ syndrome arising after
the Iraq war may be a surprise, especially given the legacy of
previous conflicts.
69 However, as the term ‘mild traumatic
brain injury’ emerges, it may be that the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan have still to get their ‘signature’ unexplained
syndrome.
87 What is indisputable is the dramatic increase in
‘explained’ syndromes that have arisen in, for example, US
soldiers who have served in the Iraq conflict. Simply because
PTSD, unlike GWS, has an accepted terminology and a
reproducible case definition, it should not follow that it too
counts as an ‘unexplained’ syndrome similar to all psychia-
tric disorders. As numerous critics have pointed out, the
assumption that trauma has central importance in the
aetiology of PTSD sits uneasily within the general atheore-
tical nature of psychiatric classification, in which syndromes
are defined by symptoms, not aetiology. There is a consider-
able critical literature on the diagnosis of PTSD, its political
as opposed to medical or research origins, and in particular
how the assumption that trauma has a central role obscures
many other factors that are also of aetiological impor-
tance.
88,89
The rise, and it is a considerable and dramatic rise, in post-
conflict psychiatric disorders now being reported from the
USA
72 must be seen as evidence that post-conflict syndromes
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more and more nations either have already moved or are in
the process of moving from large conscript or national
service armed forces to smaller, better trained professional
services, monitoring their health and their health concerns
is becoming an increasing priority. Perhaps one of the
enduring health legacies of the 1991 Gulf War has been the
launch of longer term cohort studies of either the entire
Armed Forces or large representative samples thereof, a
process that has begun in the USA, Canada, the UK,
Australia, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. Research and
health surveillance are now seen as necessary for monitoring
emerging health threats to provide empirical data and also to
provide reassurance to service personnel, their families, the
public, and the media.
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